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Abstract 
Natural languages are introspective, and here is an obvious discrepancy between feeling the language and theorizing about it by 
the means of a traditional linguistic metalanguage. This discrepancy conceals from our eyes some important issues. The aim 
consists in considering one of them and discussing the possibility of using pictorial-verbal modality for simulating introspective 
verbal language within man-machine communication. Principles of realization and general challenges of the approach are also 
discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Introspection intertwines with verbal signs throughout all processes of uttering and understanding language 
sequences within communication. As humans, we are limited: our introspective contents are located in individual 
consciousness and therefore inaccessible for other people. We are accustomed to consider this limitation of ordinary 
human communication as natural and irreducible. Relatively new types of communicators – computers and robots – 
have no introspection and therefore lack this limitation. We can make use of this fact by visualizing some 
introspective contents and, as a result, making our communicative tool mixed, that is pictorial-verbal. This new type 
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of linguistic tool not only reveals unexplored communicative possibilities, but also challenges our present 
communicative experience.  
Introspective contents incorporate our communication everywhere; nevertheless not all of them can become the 
objects of conversion from introspective into pictorial form. Consequently, for realizing the new linguistic tool, we 
should find appropriate introspective points within communication processes. In other words, the aim is to make 
some sorts of introspective contents visible within man-machine communication. This proposal is discussed in the 
following way. Section II differentiates two possibilities of viewing language: scientific and introspective. Section 
III traces brief history of introspective view. The next two sections outline main features of introspective language 
(IV) and pictorial-verbal language (V). Section VI considers perspectives of realization, Section VII – possible 
consequences and challenges associated with pictorial-verbal language. Section VIII gives conclusive remarks. 
2. Two views of language 
There are two general modes of viewing language. The first one is used when we reason about a language, 
discuss its different possibilities or regulations. This meta-level view can be called scientific. The second one is 
implemented when we simply use a language in our everyday life, when we are interested not in words, sentences or 
other language entities per se but in situations they describe or in states of our mind (emotions, intentions, requests, 
etc.) they express. In other words, we are anxious not about the means of conversation but about its object. This 
view can be called introspective.  
We follow the scientific view when we reason as linguists, philosophers, logicians, psychologists. We think and 
speak about abstract entities like words, parts of speech, phrases, and syntactic structures, grammatical or syntactic 
rules. We discuss generative or prescriptive mechanisms like grammar or word-formation. We compare the means 
of expressing some thoughts. We postulate the existence of word senses and those of propositions; we speak about 
them as if they were some commonly accessible entities. We consider contents of texts as constructed from simpler 
word senses.  
When we follow the introspective view of language we do not pay attention to such entities, structures, 
mechanisms. When we discuss everyday problems with our relatives and friends, we are interested in quite different 
things. Language becomes only a certain medium allowing us to arrange and discuss our thoughts, images, 
emotions, etc., or the constituents of the physical world; and this medium are far from being the focus of our 
attention.  
The introspective view is the ordinary way of conceiving language by its user while using it. In everyday life this 
mode is the leading one. Without it no language exists as a living one. Nevertheless, there is a gap between this view 
and the scientific one.  
This gap is often overlooked, nevertheless it is worth consideration. All linguistic questions change after 
switching from the traditional scientific framework to the introspective one. Some of those questions become 
inapplicable; others gain additional ways of resolving. 
3. Brief history of introspective view 
The division between the scientific and introspective views hypothetically goes back to the ancient Greece, to the 
well-known debates between so-called analogist and anomalist theories of language. Crates of Mallos (II B. C.), an 
adherent of the Stoic philosophy, argued for the anomalist school and Aristarchus of Samothrace (III—II B. C.) – 
for the analogist school. Those two lines of thinking can be traced until our time. Analogists were inclined to believe 
that grammatical phenomena follow analogical patterns and preferred to reject a text as incorrect if it did not fit the 
rules; analogists can be seen as the parents of the modern scientific view. Anomalists discarded the analogical 
patterns and considered each text as unique; they were declined to think that a text should be judged as correct due 
to its usage alone, not due to some rules. Anomalists can be seen as the parents of the introspective view.  
It is essential that the ancient linguists pursued predominately a pedagogical goal: they needed to teach people 
engaged in trade relations; it was also necessary to conserve the intelligibility of ancient texts for posterity. The 
analogistic view matches those aims very well; therefore, the science about language has chosen this very line of 
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thinking. Now the pedagogical origins of linguistics are fogged and thereby escape our attention. We are viewing 
language data through the conceptual scheme based on the pedagogical framework.  
Wilhelm von Humboldt and (later) Benedetto Croce, Karl Vossler, Robin George Collingwood and some other 
authors have stated the ideas congenial to the introspective view. For example Vossler questions the possibility of 
treating words as real constituents of human speech, he claims that to constitute a sentence from words, words — 
from syllables etc. means to introduce a false causality; it is the same as saying that a human body is constructed 
from parts like hands, ears, nose, etc. (Vossler, 1904).  
R. G. Collingwood has built a detailed and clear theory of language in a genuinely introspective spirit.  
Language is an activity… but this activity is not what the grammarian analyses. He analyses a product of this 
activity… The division of the ‘thing’ known as language into words is a division not discovered, but devised, in 
the process of analyzing it. (Collingwood, 1958, pp. 254-255.). 
Discourse is continuous... But selective attention breaks it up into words; vocal words if it is a discourse in 
speech, gesture words if in gesture, and so on. (Collingwood, 1992, p.40). 
Andrzej Grzegorczyk (Grzegorczyk, 1999) is not so radical towards the word senses. However, he insists that 
those senses, and a language as a whole, are always individual and temporal. 
According to Collingwood, the continuum of language is given to our mind only as a raw material, and this 
continuum seems to be identical to the raw language data provided by the introspective view. Then a linguist 
transforms this continuum by means of the traditional linguistic categorization.  
4. Introspective language 
The introspective view of language gives the mode of viewing language, not the method of its investigation. It 
represents the raw non-categorized language data consistent with different scientific methods.  
Each method is based on a certain categorization of this raw material. The above-mentioned traditional way of 
categorization (in the terms of words, parts of speech, phrases, etc.) presents the most widespread possibility; 
usually most of those categories are taken for granted. 
Every categorization serves its own goals, and the traditional one is undoubtedly convenient for very many 
purposes. Nevertheless, there can hardly be a categorization good for all the purposes. Hence, theoretically 
speaking, the raw language data accessible through the introspective view can become the object of different 
categorizations; and for some purposes there may appear alternative ways more suitable than the traditional one.  
How can one reach introspective view of language? This action can be implemented only individually, within the 
mind, and there are three main prescriptions for realizing such an operation.  
First, one should not postulate that somewhere in the mind there are linguistic objects which are not conceived 
during an ordinary communication. For example, if the word senses are not detected there, they should not be 
postulated.  
Second, one should not postulate the shared accessibility of some linguistic entities. Nobody can be absolutely 
sure that someone else understands a text in just the same way; and this fact should not be neglected.  
Third, one should follow the feelings that s(he) experiences while using a language and fix all the linguistic 
entities and processes which s(he) encounters in the conscious experience.  
The main question should be this: what does one really conceive when s(he) sees (within the mind) the content of 
some text during ordinary communication? Theoretically, this introspectively viewed content can include thoughts, 
assessments, perceptions, feelings, volitions, images, etc., i.e. everything that is conceived by a person as 
constituting the understanding of the text.  
What are the main features of the introspective view of language?  
Within this view every text has its individual and temporal content, which is seen as a whole. If we are sincere 
with ourselves we should agree that we do not construct the contents of the texts from word senses; moreover, we do 
not see any word senses at all. The content of a text is perceived like an indivisible individualized picture. A 
commonly accessible content or identity of contents can only be the matter of belief or hypothetical prediction. (We 
absolutely forget about those facts in our scientific reflections about a language.) 
Let us consider, for example, the word “clock”. A dictionary says something like this: “the clock is an instrument 
that shows the time of day. It stands on a shelf or floor, or hangs on a wall”. However, what precisely does the 
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dictionary define? It defines the class of situations to which one can refer by a simple sentence like “This is a clock”, 
“Here you see a clock”, etc. The dictionary does not define the word sense at all; it speaks about the content of a 
simple sentence. If we are asked about the sense of some word, we speak only about the situations and sentences. 
We in principle cannot speak about the word sense as about some entity different from the content of a 
corresponding simple sentence. Therefore, it is not surprising that some authors, e. g. (Wittgenstein, 1991), discuss 
the difficulties of distinguishing between “words” and “sentences”. 
Within an ordinary communication, a language is viewed by one’s introspection as a sequence of unique 
utterances, which do not form any system or mechanism.  
As opposed to this, the traditional approach represents a language as a whole, as a certain system or mechanism 
which underlies or governs a process of language activity; the content of a text is not traditionally considered as 
subjective, conceived only by an individual mind and hence unique; instead, it is posited as a shared entity 
accessible for different minds.  
Psycholinguistics, cognitive and mathematical linguistics are studying or simulating the real language activity. 
Nevertheless, even in these sciences we traditionally refer to entities like word senses as if they existed somewhere 
in our minds. We treat the contents of sentences as if they were constructed from word senses. All these principles 
are taken for granted. The traditional method of sense segmentation is very stable. Moreover, it is good for many 
problems, which are considered by the above sciences. However, why are we so sure that they are good for treating 
all the problems? The question consists not in challenging or reducing the importance of the traditional scientific 
view, but in intention to draw attention to its possible insufficiency. 
Hence, there is an obvious discrepancy between feeling the language and theorizing about it. This discrepancy 
needs to be explored. It can conceal from our eyes some important facts, problems, methods. 
For example, when we switch from the traditional scientific view to the introspective one some semantic 
problems disappear (Timofeeva, 2006), among them the problem of interchangeability, the Liar paradox, and the 
metalanguage statements. All those problems are widely discussed in philosophy, logic, linguistics. They are not the 
problems of an ordinary language of communication but those of the metalanguage.  
5. Pictorial intermediary language 
The introspective view can be useful for the computer-aided simulation of real language activities (machine 
translation, man-machine dialogue, data-base systems, search engines etc.). Such research projects generally use 
some way of representing a knowledge of the world, in particular, the one expressed by language texts. There are at 
least three possibilities of representing this knowledge: language descriptions, pictures, and diagrams (conceptual 
schemes, semantic networks).  
The said systems are frequently based on visualizable means of representing the knowledge, for example, 
diagrams. Usually they describe a universe of discourse by a certain map of concepts characterized by their 
attributes, functions, relations (super-type / sub-type, spatial, part-whole relations etc.). The attributes may indicate 
features like date, name, state, mode of existence. Since such a diagram uses language expressions (usually words) 
for naming the above concepts and relations, it can be qualified as a kind of structured language, or structured verbal 
description.  
The introspective view proposes a different approach to the same problem. Of course, we never have a one-to-
one correspondence between verbal and pictorial representations of one and the same content. For instance, we 
cannot in principle build a text describing all the details of a picture. A diagram or conceptual scheme reflecting the 
situation does not designate all the features of the depicted objects and only partly represents the information 
accessible through the picture. It is much poorer than the picture. Thus, if we compare the three ways of representing 
one and the same situation having occurred in the well-defined physical world, we can conclude that the picture is 
the most informative way (as compared with the language expressions and the conceptual scheme).  
Besides, the visualized pictorial representation of the content seems to be universally intelligible even for people 
speaking different languages. Of course, not all things can be drawn. For instance, it is not clear how one can 
represent abstract notions like “nobleness”, or “tactfulness”, etc. However, at the same time there are numerous 
things which can be easily depicted. For example, we can easily visualize many sorts of part-whole relations, as well 
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as space relations. By animating a picture, we can depict the processes of relocation, such as people moving, dog 
running or waving its tail, leaves trembling.  
The advantages of pictorial representation are summarized by the following arguments. 
1. The content of a text (as it is conceived by a speaker or a listener) is more similar to pictorial representation than 
to (structured) verbal description. When we are speaking about the physical world, we usually have in our minds 
some images, rather than (structured) verbal descriptions. 
2. A picture can be captured by a person’s eye more quickly and more perfectly than a (structured) verbal 
description.  
3. For describing in detail some situation of the external world one ought to build a large text (or scheme), 
nevertheless this representation still cannot be exhaustive and embrace all nuances. The pictorial language can be 
much more compressed and informative.  
4. The pictorial representation is universally intelligible for the people speaking different languages. When 
somebody needs to discuss a question with a foreigner and there is no language known by both of them the only 
possible actions will be: to point to the physical objects under discussion, to imitate their external view by some 
gestures, to use (draw) some images. All those actions can be easily reproduced by pictorial language. 
5. Historically, the pictographic form of language was the earliest one; pictorial writing has meaning in any 
language.  
6. Human memory is better accommodated for storing the visual information. Therefore the process of teaching a 
foreign language is often based on the pictographic dictionaries; in this case new language expressions become 
catchier.  
There are, of course, certain difficulties. Nevertheless, if we restrict ourselves to well-defined fragments of the 
physical world, the problem becomes much more realizable. Pictorial language permits us to bring continuity back 
and not to lose it in pure verbal representation. 
6. Perspectives of realization 
Fully introspective language is overly complicated for formalizing. Realistic way of creating efficient pictorial-
verbal language consists in searching those points of introspection that are convertible into pictorial form and to 
elaborate the modes of visualizing different sorts of contents.  
Leonard Talmy (Talmy, 2006; 2007) proposes the classification of introspective tools, which people use within 
communication. He differentiates two levels of introspection.  
The first one (“the first-level consciousness”) can appear in a language user’s consciousness “spontaneously or 
through evocation”. In other words, it is used in the course of ordinary communication, and does not require any 
scientific (even “school”) knowledge of linguistic notions. For instance, it is in this sense that during ordinary 
communication we see the contents of the utterances introspectively. This variant of introspection forms a 
foundation for a genuinely introspective ordinary verbal language.  
The second one (“second-level consciousness”) has as its object the contents of the first-level consciousness. This 
kind of introspection often appears volitionally in the course of a scientific investigation when the latter is directed 
at a chosen linguistic target. In this case the introspection rests upon the traditional way of categorizing language 
data (in terms of words, morphemes, parts of speech, syntactic structures, etc.). The metalanguage of such scientific 
considerations is in full accordance with the traditional linguistic notions.  
However, quite often the second-level introspection appears involuntary within an everyday dialogue and does 
not enable such categorization; a speaker can even be uneducated and ignorant about it. For example, we encounter 
this kind of introspection when somebody utters: “I have not said this” (or “Do you really think so?”, or “Have you 
really meant this?”, or “That is what you told me an hour ago!”, or “But in fact you have not told me that!”). Here 
the speaker refers (by italicizing the words this, so, that) to the content of some previously uttered text; and this 
content belongs to the first-level consciousness.  
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Thus the first-level introspection can work only directly within the real process of conversation; the second-level 
introspection can work both at the time of discourse and retrospectively. 
The first-level (together with the above-mentioned involuntary second-level) introspection represents the starting 
point for more detailed classification presented by Talmy in (Talmy, 2006).   
The picture of communication accessible through introspective mode of viewing language is furnished by the 
first-level consciousness and the previously mentioned kinds of involuntary second-level consciousness. 
This classification gives good starting point for searching introspective contents convertible into visual form. 
Appropriate candidates are discourse (second-level) contents, for example, anaphoric pronouns and other means of 
referring to previously mentioned (within the processes of communication) situations, locations, and physically 
perceivable objects. All the previous parts of a dialogue can be accessible visually, when a communicator mentions 
them. The utterances  
Yesterday I saw my friend  
You are wrong! This is the same place.  
Do you remember this meeting?  
That is what you told me an hour ago! 
can receive the pictorial support. The corresponding introspective contents (images of the friend, place, meeting, and 
part of a previous dialogue) are convertible to pictures. They can be stored in computer memory and then extracted 
from it.  
Thorough investigation of discursive introspective contents gives us many candidates for visualization. Human 
discourse memory is not visible, however that of computer or robot can be visible. It is possible, so to say, to make 
its “consciousness” transparent. The “consciousness” may even become transparent in the literal sense: possible way 
of embodying the idea consists in making the robot’s head (or a certain part of the head) of optically transparent 
material, or in embedding a special screen. During a process of human-robot communication, the visualized three-
dimensional scenes or processes from the discourse memory may develop inside of the transparent part or screen in 
parallel with verbal interaction. 
In pictorial-verbal language the set of modalities used in ordinary communication becomes richer. Simulations of 
human communication need not be combinations only of the modalities used by humans. They may include 
additional modalities. Hence, it is natural to suppose that a pictorial language can serve as an intermediary language 
of communication in computer-aided systems simulating human communicative activities. Such an intermediary 
pictorial language can also imitate an interface between a human and a computer in the interactive mode. 
Suppose, for instance, that we are developing a system of machine translation. Usually the aim of such a system 
consists in implementing text-to-text translation. In other words, the system establishes a correspondence between 
the texts written in the language X and the texts written in some other language Y; it does not involve any means for 
controlling the correspondences between the real situations of the physical world expressed by those texts; it deals 
only with the texts. Let us assume, for instance, that a system of machine translation is used as a mediator for 
implementing a dialogue between a person speaking the language X and a machine “speaking” the language Y. This 
mediator implements only text-to-text translation and hence cannot assess the similarity between the situation meant 
by a speaker and that meant by a listener. 
It is doubtful whether such a (text-to-text) guideline is universal or unique. Some applications are presumably 
more adequately implemented by turning to real situations of the physical world. In this case a pictorial language 
can serve as a means of visualizing the content of a text. Within a coherent discourse each subsequent text somehow 
modifies and refines the available pictorial representation. Thereby the collocutors can at any moment look at the 
depicted trace of the discourse. Actually, such communication is mixed: it combines the ordinary language of human 
discourse and a pictorial language. 
7. Consequences and challenges 
Pictorial-verbal language provides collocutors with additional commonly accessible facts. It is important that 
these facts are visually authentic and therefore devoid of human interpretations and subjectivity. There are several 
consequences.  
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Within pictorial-verbal mode, dialogues may become shorter because communication obtains the additional 
modality for transferring information. It is often more effective to show visible discourse referents than to describe 
them verbally. Furthermore, supporting a dialogue with visual contents makes many questions concerning locations, 
shapes or other visible features unnecessary: human-collocutor can immediately see matches and mismatches of 
images (check their correspondence to introspective contents), s(he) can revise mismatches in time, and thereby 
avoid potential misunderstandings from the very outset. Thus, transparent “consciousness” has obvious positive 
consequences.  
Additional modality helps collocutors to reveal details, make disambiguation, support and rehabilitate memories, 
disclose factual errors, make dialogue shorter, easier to capture, more accurate and concrete. 
For illustrating the idea, we will consider three communicative situations, and two very short dialogues for each 
situation. All the dialogues are between human and robot, one dialogue is pure verbal and another - pictorial-verbal. 
The situation 1a (purely verbal dialogue) 
Human: There was the piano in the room 
Robot:   
(Here the image of a piano does not appear. Correspondingly, the details remain in the shadow of the human 
consciousness and are not revealed explicitly.)  
The situation 1b (pictorial-verbal modality) 
Human: There was the piano in the room 
Robot: <image of a black piano> 
Human: No, the white one 
Robot: <image of a white piano> 
(Here mixed pictorial-verbal dialogue helps to reveal the details: the image of a piano was visualized by a robot, 
and mismatch between two images – that of human and that of robot - became obvious.)   
The situation 2a (purely verbal dialogue) 
Robot: A book was on a table, it was green 
Human: What do you mean by “it”?  
Robot: The table 
The initial phrase is ambiguous: it is not clear what the antecedent of the pronoun it is: a book or a table. 
Therefore, the human asks for refinement. 
Another dialogue concerning the same situation is shorter and unambiguous because it is based on visual 
images.  
The situation 2b (pictorial-verbal modality) 
Robot: A book was on a table, it was green  
            <the image of a book on a green table> 
Human:   
The situation 3a (purely verbal dialogue) 
Human: When you spoke with a lady a large dog appeared. 
Robot:   
Here the human erroneously refers by the utterance to the circumstances of some previous communication 
between the same collocutors. There are no corresponding visual images and the factual mistake remains 
undisclosed. 
The situation 3a (pictorial-verbal modality) 
Human: When you spoke with a lady a large dog appeared 
Robot: <the image of the dog is reproduced from discourse memory recorded in the robot’s consciousness>  
Human: Oh, I am mistaken; it was a wee little doggy 
Here mixed pictorial-verbal dialogue helps to show factual errors, to restore reminiscences.  
One more consequence increases the same possibilities of additional modality. Artificial discourse memory is 
extensible. Computer-collocutor is able to collect discourse experience, including the visualizations under 
discussion. Moreover, previous collocutors, places of communication, previously performed actions (not only 
verbal) also can be visually fixed and stored. In other words, computer-collocutor can have extensive discourse 
memory including visual information about a history of verbal and non-verbal actions related to a dialogue.      
The above-said abilities of artificial memory can make robot-human discussions shorter, more accurate and 
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more concrete.  
Nevertheless, there is other type of consequences, and one may consider them as ambivalent. The opposite side 
of human ability to see immediately matches and mismatches of images (to introspective discourse contents) 
consists in making deceptions and other modifications of previously encountered utterances or situations explicit. 
This fact may have positive or negative effect.  
Sometimes distortion of a discourse memory is unintentional. In this case, pictorial-verbal language may affect 
positively and help to rehabilitate human reminiscences. Possibly, communicating by the means of pictorial-verbal 
language will give a certain support for people suffering from memory disorders.  
However, in some cases human-collocutors may be not ready to such severe circumstances of communication. 
People may avoid some recollections, or smooth them, or do not want to perceive them visually. The decision may 
consist in providing a robot-collocutor with an option of switching off the visual modality, and using pure verbal 
language instead of pictorial-verbal. In other words, it should be possible, figuratively speaking, to “close the 
window to consciousness”.  
One more way of modifying previous discourse memory by human-collocutor is lying. Transparent 
“consciousness” is able to make some sorts of lies explicit. The effects depend on situation of lying and importance 
of distorted facts. These effects are apparently different for a lying person and for an external spectator. Intentional 
distorting of a discourse remembrance by a liar may provoke additional questions posed by a spectator. At the same 
time, being alone with a robot-collocutor, human may ignore mismatches, or try to explore discourse deviations 
from visual facts, peculiarities of lying in general, differences between deception and imagination. 
These consequences present certain challenges: we cannot foreknow exactly the effects of mentioned processes 
on human mind, cognition and communicative strategies. Pictorial-verbal language can give people an opportunity 
to investigate these effects experimentally. 
8. Conclusion 
Pictorial-verbal language can provide representations more similar to raw situational data than a linguistic 
description or diagram, especially when we limit conversation to well-defined fragments of the physical world.  
This fact is laden with consequences giving arguments in behalf of pictorial intermediary language used for 
simulating ordinary language activity in computer-aided systems.  
The best candidates for exploring this way of developing man-machine communication seem to be discursive 
introspective contents (as the objects of conversion into pictorial form).  
Pictorial-verbal language has a potential of changing communication fundamentally. For human being 
introspection is like a window into consciousness. No one is able to open this window for other people. On the 
contrary, we can imitate and open (even visualize) similar window to computer’s “consciousness”. This is a certain 
challenge, which can influence not only human communication but also human mind. Visualized introspective 
discourse contents provide collocutors with additional facts. Moreover, artificial collocutor is able to collect 
discourse experience, including the visualizations under discussion. Consequences are various: dialogues may 
become shorter, deceptions and other modifications of previously encountered utterances or situations – explicit, 
discussions – more accurate, discourse memory – extensible. All cognitive abilities associated with mentioned 
processes are significant and worthy of investigation.  
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